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At one time, the only social responsibility of a business was to increase
its profits.1 During this period, businesses prized dictatorships for their
ability to provide stable environments2 and consumers were not concerned
with either where or by whom the shoes they wore were made. However,
the increase in globalization changed perceptions. Multinational
corporations ("MNCs") began to benefit immensely from globalization and
those outside of the MNC environment started to realize that an MNC's
profit gains brought about a corresponding responsibility to manage any
adverse effects of producing those gains . Suddenly, a company's success
was measured by factors other than its bottom-line. In addition, the
reputation of a company thought to be involved in some form of human
rights abuse could suffer irreparable damage and consumers began to
demand detailed information on corporate activities.
4
The rise of the accountability movement resulted in an increased
awareness of the relationship between business and human rights.
LL.B., LL.M. (Columbia Law School).1 Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits, N.Y.
TIMES MAG., Sept. 13, 1970, at 32.
2 JOHN ELKINGTON, CANNIBALS WITH FORKS: THE TRIPLE BOTTOM LINE OF 21 ST CENTURY
BUSINESS 110 (1998).
3 For example, as noted by U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan: "Transnational
companies have been the first to benefit from globalization. They must take their share of
responsibility for coping with its effects." Kofi A. Annan, Help the Third World Help Itself,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1999, at A28.
4 Chris Avery, Business and Human Rights in a Time of Change, in LIABILITY OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (M.T. Kamminga & S. Zia-
Zarifi eds., 2000).
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However, the movement has been unable to prompt the development of an
effective mechanism to ensure that MNCs are held responsible for any
transnational adversities they cause, particularly where the host state is
unable or unwilling to address the problems. Nevertheless, several alleged
victims of corporate abuse have turned to litigation in U.S. domestic courts
as one means of attempting to hold corporations accountable. Individuals
have brought cases against the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, Chevron Corp.,
ExxonMobil Corp., Pfizer Inc., the Coca-Cola Company, and The Gap, for
such violations as torture, forced labor and gross human rights breaches. 5
The basis for these claims was, in most cases, the Alien Tort Claims Act
("ATCA"), a U.S. statute that permits foreign citizens to sue in U.S. courts
for violations of international law.6
Yet, individuals using the ATCA to hold MNCs accountable for
human rights violations have not met with considerable success. Although
jurisprudence has established that the ATCA can be applied to individuals
and corporations, no case concerning corporations has been determined on
its merits. Additionally, in Sosa v. Alvarez, the first ATCA decision
considered by the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court took a cautious approach
in interpreting and defining the scope of the ATCA.7 It noted that the
ATCA was to be used only for a "relatively modest set of actions alleging
violations of the law of nations"8 and it advocated the restraint of federal
court discretion in creating any new causes of action under the ATCA.9
Moreover, in a footnote, the Court remarked that determining a cause of
action under the ATCA also includes considering whether international law
extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the
perpetrator being sued if the defendant is a private actor such as a
corporation or individual.' 0 Under this reasoning, the ATCA does not
necessarily have jurisdiction over corporations.
The Supreme Court's restrictive approach to the ATCA also provides
less credence to the ATCA as an effective mechanism for ensuring
corporate accountability. Moreover, the Court's denouncement of the
creation of any new causes of action hampers its usefulness, as MNC
actions that stray beyond the accepted grounds will not be susceptible to
5 INT'L COUNCIL ON HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM: HUMAN RIGHTS
AND THE DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANIES 104 (2002),
available at http://www.ichrp.org; SARAH JOSEPH, TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION AGAINST CORPORATIONS 155-169 (2004).
6 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) ("The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations or a treaty of the United States.")
7 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S.Ct. 2739 (2004).
Id. at 2759.
I d. at 2761-62.
10 Id. at 2766-67.
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court action. In fact, the very existence of the ATCA's reach to
corporations may be threatened due to reports that the Bush administration
intends to restrict the ambit of the ATCA. 1
Given these potential restrictions, the purpose of this article is to
examine other mechanisms or modes for attributing liability to corporations
for human rights violations. The article is presented in three parts. In the
first part, domestic solutions are considered, including civil and criminal
remedies in the United States and other countries. In addition, the ATCA is
more thoroughly examined, as it is, in spite of its problems, the most
utilized means for attaching liability to corporations. The second part
examines potential international solutions including the possible role of the
International Criminal Court, the creation of specialized tribunals and codes
of conduct developed by several international organizations. Finally, the
article concludes with a suggested approach for the most effective means of
ensuring corporate accountability.
II. DOMESTIC SOLUTIONS
One domestic approach for addressing corporate accountability is to
have state courts extend their jurisdiction to violations committed abroad.
Certain states have promulgated extraterritorial legislation similar to the
ATCA that extends the arm of the state beyond its territory. Other states
have allowed parties to rely on domestic law and argue their complaints
before domestic courts if a substantial connection is found between the state
and the parties to the action. Both modes are considered in the following
section.
A. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
Although many have supported the idea of combating corporate abuses
committed beyond a state's territory, only one other country besides the
United States has opened the doors of its courts to allow non-residents to
sue corporations for alleged violations of human rights. In 1999, Belgium
introduced the Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of
International Humanitarian Law ("the Act"). 12 The purpose of the Act was
11 For example, in 2003, U.S. President George W. Bush passed an executive order
providing blanket legal immunity to oil companies doing business in Iraq. This order
suggests the prohibition of legitimate lawsuits, including ATCA actions, by individuals
injured by American oil companies in Iraq. See Exec. Order No. 13,303, 68 Fed. Reg. 31,931
(May 22, 2003), reprinted in EARTH RIGHTS INTERNATIONAL, Executive Order 13303:
Instituting Immunity (Aug. 13, 2003), at http://www.earthrights.org/news/
institutingimmunity.shtml.
12 For an English translation of the Act, see Stefaan Smis & Kim Van der Borght,
Belgium: Act Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches of International Humanitarian
Law, 38 I.L.M. 918 (1999).
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to define three categories of grave breaches of humanitarian law, and to
integrate these breaches into the domestic law of Belgium: genocide, crimes
against humanity, and grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
their Additional Protocols I and 11.13 One of the most novel aspects of the
Act was its recognition of the "universal competence" of the Belgian courts
to deal with breaches of the Act irrespective of the place where the crime
was committed, the nationality of the accused, or the nationality of the
victim. 14 In fact, the Act required no ties between the alleged crime and
Belgium.
The Act was used as a basis to investigate Totalfinaelf, a French
company, regarding allegations of its complicity in engaging Burmese
workers into forced labor in Myanmar and to prosecute several notable
individuals for their involvement in the war in Iraq.' 5 The latter set of
prosecutions prompted the United States to pressure Belgium into amending
its law. Belgium succumbed and the Act was amended to exercise
jurisdiction only over Belgian citizens or long-term residents. 16 As a result
the power of the Belgian courts to exercise universal competence has now
been eliminated. Thus, the ATCA remains the primary mechanism for
exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction and, accordingly, is examined below
in greater detail.
In 1789, the U.S. government promulgated the ATCA as an attempt to
prevent the United States from becoming a safe haven for pirates.1 7 Today,
the ATCA has been reformulated to hold that: "The district courts shall
have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only,
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States."'8 The ATCA thus contains three requirements: (1) the substance of
the matter must be a civil tort action; (2) the action must be brought by an
alien; and (3) the matter must concern a violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.19
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Prosecutions were launched against Bush, British Prime Minister Tony Blair, and other
related individuals. See Universal Incompetence, ECONOMIST, June 28, 2003, at 54.
16 Belgium Amends War Crimes Law, BBC NEWS, Aug. 1, 2003, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/3116975.stm.
17 This is but one theory postulated to explain Congress' intentions in enacting the
ATCA. This theory is supported by Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995)
(holding that the idea of applying the law of nations reference in the ATCA to the acts of
private individuals is supported by the prohibition against piracy cases that existed around
the time Congress enacted the ATCA). For other possible theories as to why Congress
enacted the ATCA, see Peter Schuyler Black, Kadic v. Karadzic: Misinterpreting the Alien
Tort Claims Act, 31 GA. L. REv. 281, 281-2 (1996).
18 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
19 Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3293, at *10 (S.D.N.Y.
Feb. 22, 2002). Although these three requirements provide the basis for an ATCA claim
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Neither of the first two requirements poses a substantial problem of
interpretation. Among the long list of possible torts, the courts have
accepted that the torts of genocide, forced labor, war crimes, and torture are
torts within the meaning of the ATCA.2 ° In addition, the requirement that
the action be brought by an alien only requires that an individual other than
a U.S. national bring the claim.
However, the courts have had problems interpreting the definition of
"the law of nations." In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 21 the first case to resurrect
the ATCA, the court noted that the law of nations involves the
demonstration of a wrong by means of express international accords.22 In
finding that torture was a violation of the law of nations, the court further
determined that universal condemnation in numerous international
agreements and the renunciation of it, in principle or in practice, by almost
all the world states, would also evidence a violation of the law of nations.23
Several years later, a second court further defined an international tort as
being "definable, obligatory (rather than hortatory), and universally
condemned" and this test became the standard evidence of a violation of the
law of nations.24 In Sosa, the Supreme Court reinforced this definition,
arguing that international norms which form the basis for an ATCA claim
must be specific or find their genesis in customary international law.25
In addition to problems defining the law of nations, ATCA litigation
has also encountered difficulties defining the scope of ATCA liability. In
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,26 the D.C. Circuit refused to attribute
(that is they establish subject matter jurisdiction), claimants must also satisfy numerous
procedural and substantive requirements. See Developments in the Law - International
Criminal Law: Corporate Liability for Violations of International Human Rights Law, 114
HARV. L. REV. 2025, 2036 (2001) [hereinafter Corporate Liability].
20 See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 238;
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980); lwanova v. Ford Motor Co., 67 F.
Supp. 2d 424 (D.N.J. 1999).
21 Filartiga involved the torture of Joelito Filartiga in Paraguay by the then Inspector
General of Police, Americo Norberto Pena-Irala. Although Pena-Irala admitted to the torture,
the Paraguayan courts denied the Filartiga family the right to file a lawsuit against him. Two
years later, Pena-Irala traveled to New York where he was arrested for an expired visa.
While in the custody of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Filartiga family
initiated an action against Pena-Irala under the ATCA. The case was initially dismissed for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction and Pena-Irala returned to Paraguay. On appeal, however,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled in favor of the Filartiga family, and
they were subsequently awarded damages of more than $5 million. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at
876.
22 Id. at 888.
23 Id. at 880.
24 Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
25 Sosa, 124 S.Ct. at 2761-62, 2765-67 (2004).
26 Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Tel-Oren involved
an attack by the Palestine Liberation Organization ("PLO") on a civilian Israeli bus, where
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international law liability to a private actor, finding that there was
insufficient consensus in international law on this matter. In contrast,
eleven years later in Kadic v. Karadzic,27 the Second Circuit confirmed the
holding in Filartiga, finding that torts of an international character
committed by private actors could violate international law. The finding in
Kadic was then used by claimants to argue that a corporation, as a legal
private actor, could also violate international law and in Unocal, the Ninth
28Circuit accepted this argument.
However, the Unocal decision does not necessarily define the current
state of this issue. In Sosa, the Supreme Court recognized that the scope of
ATCA liability for a corporation was important in a determination of a
proper claim under the ATCA, citing the contrasting findings in Tel-Oren
and Kadic. Nevertheless, it did not provide further comment on the matter,
allowing the contrasting dicta to govern the issue. In addition, subsequent
to the Ninth Circuit's holding in Unocal, the decision was vacated and
appealed to an en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit.29 However, in December
2004 the parties settled before a decision could be rendered.30 Thus, the
scope of ATCA liability as it relates to a corporation currently remains in
flux.
In addition to the limits placed on it by the Supreme Court's holding in
Sosa on the type of torts that can form its basis and the problems defining
the scope of ATCA liability for corporations, the ATCA also suffers from a
number of other shortcomings. First, most of the jurisprudence in this area
has imposed the additional requirement of state aid. That is, a successful
claim must demonstrate that the corporation has acted in concert with a
state actor or with state aid.3' Thus, corporate abuses committed without a
state component will, most likely, not be justiciable under the ATCA.
Second, the ATCA can only be utilized where a U.S. court can establish
personal jurisdiction over the defendant.32 U.S. courts will generally
exercise personal jurisdiction only where a "sufficient connection" exists
between the court and the defendant, and this can raise insurmountable
members of the PLO tortured and killed many of the civilians. The court ruled that
international terrorism was not justiciable, individuals could not violate international law and
torture did not violate the law of nations.
27 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-41.
28 Unocal, 395 F.3d at 932.
29 Id. at 978.
30 Press Release, EarthRights International, Unocal to Compensate Burmese Villagers
(Apr. 2, 2005), at http://www.earthrights.org/news/pressunocalsettle.shtml.
31 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-40; Sarah M. Hall, Multinational Corporations' Post-Unocal
Liabilities for Violations of International Law, 34 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 401, 410
(2002).
32 Corporate Liability, supra note 19, at 2038; Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226
F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 2000).
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hurdles for plaintiffs.33
Finally, several claimants have met with the ultimate ATCA hurdle:
forum non conveniens.3 4 In determining this issue, courts consider whether
an adequate alternative forum exists for the effective adjudication of the
dispute, which can involve the weighing of certain "private interest" and
"public interest" factors. 35 These may include the ease of access to sources
of proof, the process and cost of obtaining witnesses, administrative duties,
and the idea that localized controversies benefit from being "decided at
home. ' ' 6 However, the Second Circuit has noted that a dismissal of an
ATCA action underforum non conveniens would frustrate Congress' intent
in establishing the ATCA forum for aliens.37 Accordingly, it will not
dismiss ATCA actions lightly.38 Nevertheless, the host of problems with
the ATCA has forced certain claimants to develop other means of
attributing liability to corporations, which will be examined in the next
section. Moreover, as the ATCA is generally used to attack U.S.
corporations, claimants interested in pursuing remedies against foreign
corporations have had to turn to domestic remedies in the home state of the
corporation.39  As a result, claims have been brought in the courts of
Australia, Canada, and England, and these states' responses will also be
considered in the next section.
B. Civil Litigation Remedies Beyond the ATCA
In addition to the ATCA in the United States, claimants in both the
United States and foreign nations can initiate actions against corporations
for abuses committed abroad based on commonplace torts. Thus, the torts
of wrongful death, battery, negligence, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress, can encapsulate human rights abuses such as executions,
torture, hazardous waste spills and inhuman treatment. 0 A closer look at
33 See generally e.g., Corporate Liability, supra note 19, at 2028; Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 94.
34 See, e.g., Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998); Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc.,
142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
35 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947); Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Reyno, 454
U.S. 235, 250-61 (1981).
36 Id.; see also Phillip I. Blumberg, Asserting Human Rights Against Multinational
Corporations Under United States Law: Conceptual and Procedural Problems, 50 AM. J.
COMP. L. 493 (2002).
" Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 105; Jota, 157 F.3d at 159.
38 Wiwa, 226 F.39 at 106.
39 Plaintiffs must demonstrate a substantial connection between the defendant corporation
and a U.S. court in order for the court to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. See
Corporate Liability, supra note 19, at 2025 (2001); Wiwa, 226 F.3d at 88.
40 Craig Scott, Translating Torture into Transnational Tort: Conceptual Divides in the
Debate on Corporate Accountability for Human Rights Harms, in TORTURE AS TORT 62
(Craig Scott ed., 2000). See also Dagi v. The Broken Hill Proprietary Co., [1997] 1 V.R.
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particular domestic civil remedies offered by jurisdiction follows.
1. The United States
Remedies for abuses committed abroad are highly developed in the
United States. In addition to the ATCA and civil suits based on
commonplace torts, the United States also offers abuse victims protection
under the rubrics of transitory torts, the Torture Victim Protection Act
("TVPA"), 4 1 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
("RICO") 42 statute.
U.S. state courts have the ability to extend their jurisdiction for
transitory torts. Under the doctrine of transitory torts, civil actions for torts
are considered transitory when "the tortfeasor's wrongful acts create an
obligation which follows him across national boundaries. 43 Plaintiffs have
used transitory torts to form the basis of their claims against corporations
for hazardous spills, environmental damage, and poisonings by pesticides.
44
However, most claims that use transitory torts as their basis have been
dismissed on grounds offorum non conveniens.45
Human rights abuse victims can also seek shelter under the TVPA.
The TVPA provides a civil cause of action to both aliens and U.S. citizens
for acts of torture and extra-judicial killings committed by individuals
acting under the actual or apparent authority of a foreign government.46
Generally, the TVPA is thought to include corporations, which can be the
"individuals" conmitting the tortuous or murderous acts.47 Yet, as it
requires the individuals to be acting in concert with a government, its ambit
excludes acts committed by corporations without state aid.
One further statutory basis for corporate abuse claims is the RICO
428; Third Amended Complaint for Damages and Injunctive and Declaratory Relief for
Plaintiff, Doe I v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002) (No. 96-6959), available at
http://www.earthrights.org/unocal/fedcomplaint.shtml.
41 Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
42 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C §§ 1961-68 (2000).
43 Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over International
Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Claims Act After Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 53, 63 (1981).
44 See, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December,
1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd in part 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987);
Sequihua v. Texaco, Inc. 847 F. Supp. 61 (S.D. Tex. 1994); Dow Chemicals v. Castro
Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990).
45 Malcolm J. Rogge, Towards Transnational Corporate Liability in the Global
Economy: Challenging the Doctrine of Forum non Conveniens in In Re: Union Carbide,
Alfaro, Sequihua, andAguinda, 36 TEX. INT'L. L.J. 299, 302, 323 (2001).
46 Id.
47 See Sinaltrainal v. Coca Cola Co., 256 F. Supp 2d 1345, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 2003); Estate
of Rodriguez v. Drummond, 256 F. Supp 2d 1250, 1266 (N.D. Ala. 2003). But see Beanal v.
Freeport-McMoran Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997).
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statute, which Congress enacted to target organized crime. However, its
definition of "racketeering" is so expansive that it can be used to
encapsulate corporate human rights claims as well.48  Thus, in Wiwa v
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,4 9 the plaintiffs relied on aspects of the
definition of racketeering in RICO to argue that the corporation had
engaged in bribery, murder, and extortion.50  The court allowed the
plaintiffs' RICO claims, finding that the company's racketeering activities,
if proven, would have effects on the U.S. economy sufficient to justify
jurisdiction.5
2. Canada
Unlike the many avenues created by the United States for addressing
extraterritorial corporate abuses, Canada continues to offer its victims only
traditional torts as a basis for their claims. Moreover, Canada is extremely
restrictive in its approach towards extending extraterritorial jurisdiction,
requiring that a "real and substantial connection" must exist with the
forum.5 As a result, several corporate transnational abuse cases in Canada
have been dismissed on grounds offorum non conveniens.
For example, in Recherches Internationales Qu~bec v. Cambior Inc.,53
the Quebec Superior Court was presented with a class action against a
Quebec corporation initiated by 23,000 victims of an environmental spill
from a gold mine in Guyana. The court dismissed the action forforum non
conveniens noting that Guyana was a more convenient forum for the action
since the parties and the action had a closer connection to Guyana.54
However, it did note that if it felt that the Guyanese legal system was
inadequate, it would have had "little hesitation" in accepting jurisdiction of
the victims' complaints. 5
Similarly, in Bouzari v. Iran,56 in which the claimant sued the Iranian
government in an Ontario court for his abduction, imprisonment and torture
by Iranian agents, the court found that there was an insufficient real and
48 RICO defines racketeering in part to mean: "(a) any act or threat involving murder,
kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion ... which is chargeable under State
law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year." Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C § 1961(1) (2000).
49 Wiwa, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at 3293 (further proceedings after remand).
" Id. at *66-85.
51 Id. at *71. However, RICO is unlikely to usurp the ATCA's role as the first choice in
the United States for addressing transnational abuses due to the courts' willingness to accept
jurisdiction over a broader range of violations under the ATCA.
52 See, e.g., Bouzari v. Iran, [2004] 71 O.R.3d 675 T 31.
53 Recherches Internationales Qu6bec v. Cambior Inc., [1998] Q.J. No. 2554.
54 Id. 72-77.
55 Id.
56 Bouzari, [2004] 71 O.R.3d at 675.
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substantial connection between the wrongdoing that gave rise to the
litigation and the forum. However, both the Ontario Superior Court and the
Ontario Court of Appeal refused to determine the claim on jurisdictional
grounds and dismissed the case instead on grounds of Iran's sovereign
immunity.57 Nevertheless, the Ontario Superior Court noted that the rules
dictating the "real and substantial test" could be modified in cases where the
claim is for torture.58 The Court of Appeal also confirmed the ability to
modify the "real and substantial connection test," noting that the hallmark
of the test is its flexibility. Moreover, the Court found that because the test
is ultimately guided by order and fairness, it can meet the special challenges
of a case.5 The Bouzari decision thus opens the door to a more flexible
approach in using the real and substantial connection test to determine
jurisdiction for extraterritorial human rights abuse cases.
The court in Wilson v. Servier has also approached the au0lication of
the real and substantial test with some degree of flexibility. The case
involved a class action by plaintiffs based in Ontario for medical problems
allegedly caused by drugs which were distributed by the Canadian
subsidiary of a French pharmaceutical company. The court allowed the
plaintiffs' claims against the French company, finding that "but for" the
French company, the drugs in question would not have been marketed in
Canada, which accordingly established a real and substantial connection to
the forum.61
However, procedural hurdles other than forum non conveniens remain
for claimants bringing actions in Canadian courts for corporate abuses
committed abroad. In Tolofson v. Jensen the Supreme Court of Canada
enacted a choice of law rule for torts committed in a jurisdiction other than
that in which the action was being brought. The case involved
interprovincial rather than international issues, with the Court concluding
that the law of the site of the tort would be the governing law.6 3 In doing so,
the Court disregarded British law and the U.S. doctrine on transitory torts,
which holds that the law of the forum applies in adjudicating wrongs
committed in another country if the wrong is "unjusticiable" in the country
57 id.
58 Id. 19.
59 Id. 30. For example, in Bouzari, the Court of Appeal for Ontario expressed concern
over dismissing Bouzari's claim on jurisdictional grounds because it would unfairly leave
him without a forum for justice. Nevertheless, the court was reluctant to modify the real and
substantial test, most likely because the laws protecting Iran's sovereign immunity clearly
prevented the Ontario courts from exercising jurisdiction in this case.
60 Wilson v. Servier Canada, Inc., [2000] 50 O.R.3d 219.
61 Id. 14, 21.
62 Tolofson v. Jensen, [1994] 3 S.C.R. 1022.
63 Id. at 1050.
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in which the wrong is committed.64
Tolofson sets a highly limiting precedent for extraterritorial corporate
abuse cases. If the site of the tort where the abuse was committed does not
recognize the act committed as being wrong, the corporation will escape
liability. Although the Supreme Court noted that exceptions to the tort
choice of law rule would be made in international cases to avoid injustice, it
also stated that the exception would be limited to only a few cases.65 Thus,
the Supreme Court's dicta on exceptions to the tort choice of law rule may
encapsulate egregious corporate abuses, but the law of the site in which the
tort was committed will still govern corporate acts that do not cross the
egregious threshold.
3. Australia
As in Canada, Australia has not had extensive involvement in
extraterritorial corporate abuse litigation. This is somewhat surprising
given Australia's lenient approach to exercising its jurisdiction over
extraterritorial matters.
Australian states can exercise jurisdiction on extraterritorial claims if
there is a nexus between the extraterritorial act and the jurisdiction.66
Moreover, as long as the foreign corporation conducts business in the
Australian state, it is susceptible to personal jurisdiction. 67 Furthermore,
Australia has adopted a rather plaintiff-deferential formula for determining
the forum non conveniens issue. Under Australian law, the plaintiffs
choice of forum is given deference unless the plaintiff is bringing the suit in
an oppressive or vexatious manner, or if allowing the claim in the selected
forum will amount to an injustice to the defendant and the alternative forum
will not occasion an injustice to the plaintiff.68  A later case has also
confirmed that forum non conveniens will dismiss an action only if the
Australian forum will bring about an injustice that is oppressive,
prejudicial, or vexatious in terms of serious trouble and harassment. 69
Accordingly, it is very difficult for a defendant in Australia to have a claim
against it dismissed for reasons offorum non conveniens.
Thus, in Dagi v. The Broken Hill Proprietary Company Ltd.,7° where
64 Id. at 1052.
65 Id. at 1054.
66 Australian courts interpret the required nexus rather leniently. Damages suffered partly
within Australia, being a resident of Australia, or receiving medical treatment in Australia all
demonstrate the required nexus. See JOSEPH, supra note 5, at 122.
67 Id. at 123.
68 Oceanic Sun Line Special Shipping Co. v. Fay (1988) 165 C.L.R. 197; Voth v.
Manildra Flour Mills Pty, Ltd. (1990) 171 C.L.R. 538.
69 Regie Nationale des Usines Renault SA v. Zhang (2002) 210 C.L.R. 491, 521.
70 Dagi v. The Broken Hill Proprietary Co., [1997] 1 V.R. 428.
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the victims sued the defendant, an Australian company, for injuries
resulting from the discharge of by-products from a mine the company
owned in Papua New Guinea, the defendants did not raise the issue of
forum non conveniens. Instead, the court proceeded to examine the merits
of the case. Although the court refused to exercise jurisdiction over most of
the victims' claims,7' it did note that it had jurisdiction over actions in
negligence if:
[F]irst, the circumstances giving rise to the claim are of such a character
that, if they occurred within Victoria, a cause of action would have
arisen entitling the plaintiff to enforce against the defendant a civil
liability of the kind which the plaintiff claims to enforce; and second, by
the law of the place in which the wrong occurred, the circumstances of
the occurrence gave rise to, and at the time of judgment continue to give
rise to, a civil liability of the kind which the plaintiff claims to enforce.72
The Dagi claim was found not to have met this test; however, the court
held that the negligence claims in the other related actions based on the
plaintiffs' loss of amenity or enjoyment of the land and waters were
justiciable. 73  The dispute eventually resulted in an out-of-court
settlement.74
4. England
Unlike Canada and Australia, which have had limited experience in
addressing corporate human rights abuses committed abroad, England has
experienced a series of disputes in which workers in Africa have attempted
to attribute liability to English corporations. Generally, plaintiffs' claims
are derived using either customary international law, which is a part of the
English common law, or the Private International Law Miscellaneous
Provisions Act of 1995, which governs transnational tort cases.
English courts will also willingly adjudicate on corporate abuses
committed abroad if there is not another "available forum, having
competent jurisdiction, which is the appropriate forum for the trial of the
action." 75 Considerations taken into account in assessing the appropriate
71 Dagi, [1997] 1 V.R. at 443. The court rejected many of the claims on the grounds of
the Mozambique principle, which essentially states that a court does not have jurisdiction to
entertain an action for the determination of the title to, or the right to possession of, any
immovable situate on a foreign land. See British South Africa Co. v. Companhia de
Mogambique, [1893] A.C. 602 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
72 Dagi, [1997] 1 V.R. at 443.
73 Id.
74 Peggy Rodgers Kalas, International Environmental Dispute Resolution and The Need
For Access By Non-State Entities, 12 COLO. J. INT'L. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 191, n.55 (2001).
75 Spiliada Maritime Corp. v. Cansulex Ltd., [1987] A.C. 460, 476 (H.L.); Connelly v.
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forum include the interests of the parties, the nature of the subject matter
and the likelihood of achieving "substantive justice" in the other forum.7 6
Nevertheless, even if the other forum is clearly the more appropriate
choice, the courts have noted that they retain the discretion to keep the
action in England if justice requires it.7' Because of this expansive test, the
English courts have allowed South African workers injured by an English-
owned mine in South Africa, a British worker injured on the job in
Namibia, and South Africans living near an English-owned mine in South
Africa, to all successfully sue the English companies in England.78
Although in two of the above cases a forum outside of England was
deemed more appropriate due to the location of the witnesses, the injury
sustained, and the evidence, the courts selected England as the appropriate
forum for the disputes because of financial considerations. Thus, in
Connelly v. RTZ Corporation PLC and Another,79 the court found that the
nature and complexity of the case warranted either legal aid or a
contingency fee arrangement, both of which were unavailable in Namibia,
where the injury took place. 80 As a result, "substantial justice" required that
England be the selected forum for the dispute.
81
The Connelly decision was reinforced in Lubbe v. Cape Plc.82 In
Lubbe, thousands of plaintiffs who either worked in or lived near an
asbestos mine in South Africa, or were somehow associated with the
transport of the product, sued the English company whose subsidiary
83
companies operated the mine. As in Connelly, the evidence pointed to
South Africa as the appropriate forum for the dispute, and initially the
English courts dismissed the action in England on forum non conveniens.84
However, observing that the class action initiated by the plaintiffs required
efficiency, cost-effectiveness, professional lawyer supervision, expert
advice, and evidence, the House of Lords held that only England could be
the appropriate forum for the dispute. The House of Lords was concerned
that South Africa did not provide legal aid, contingency fees or other
financial arrangements to afford the plaintiffs the possibility of obtaining
RTZ Corp. Plc., [1997] 4 All E.R. 335 (H.L.).
76 Id.
77 id.
78 See, e.g., Ngcobo v. Thor Chemicals Holdings Ltd., [1995] T.L.R. 10 (Eng. C.A.);
Sithole v. Thor Chemicals Holdings Ltd. [1999] T.L.R. 110 (Eng. C.A); Connelly, [1997] 4
All E.R. at 335; Lubbe v. Cape Plc. [2000] 4 All E.R. 268 (H.L.).
79 Connelly, [1997] 4 All E.R. at 335.
80 Id.
81 However, Connelly's claim was subsequently struck down by the courts on limitation
grounds. Connelly v. Rio Tinto Zinc Corp. Plc., [1998] A.C. 584 (Q.B.).
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what was needed for the action.85 The English Court's reliance on financial
considerations as an overriding factor suggests that England has taken great
strides to join the United States in having its national courts adjudicate
injuries sustained in foreign jurisdictions.
C. Criminal Litigation
Given that MNCs have been accused of engaging in acts such as
torture, murder, and abduction, criminal prosecutions of corporations in
domestic courts may be another possible alternative for attributing liability
for extraterritorial abuses. Moreover, criminal prosecutions provide victims
with the remedy of imprisonment which is not offered by any other solution
and may be the strongest means of holding wrongdoers accountable.
Generally, most states allow for the criminal prosecution of
corporations, although the jurisdiction over these crimes is mostly limited to
crimes committed within a state's territory.86 Nonetheless, extraterritorial
corporate abuses that are planned or directed from an office within the
state's territory would likely fall under a state's criminal jurisdiction so long
as the planning/directing agents or employees represent the directing mind
of the corporation or are acting for the benefit, or on behalf of, the
corporation.87
However, most states have also made allowances for extraterritorial
jurisdiction for egregious crimes. For example, Australia exercises criminal
jurisdiction over individuals who have engaged in slave trade outside of
Australia; 88 Canada extends its jurisdiction over the crimes of genocide,
crimes against humanity, or war crimes which are committed outside of
Canada; 89 the United Kingdom provides redress in its courts for the crimes
of genocide and crimes against humanity committed by U.K. citizens either
in the U.K. or abroad.90
It is interesting that the crimes of forced labor, genocide, and those
crimes that fall under the ambit of crimes against humanity, which are
recognized by several states as being of sufficient importance to warrant
extraterritorial jurisdiction, are equivalent to the limited scope of applicable
85 Id.
86 See Criminal Code, R.S.C., ch. C-46, § 6(2) (1985) (Can.); Stephen Powles et al., A
Comparative Survey of Private Sector Liability for Grave Violations of International Law in
National Jurisdictions - United Kingdom (2003), at http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/UK.pdf
(showing that the criminal jurisdiction of English courts is primarily based upon the location
of the accused within the jurisdiction).
87 See FAFO & INT'L PEACE ACAD., Business and International Crimes: Assessing the
Liability of Business Entities for Grave Violations of International Law (2004), at
http://www.fafo.no/liabilities (for Executive Summary, Commentary, and National Surveys).
88 Criminal Code Act, 1995, § 270.3(2) (Austl.).
89 Crimes Against Humanity and War Crimes Act, R.S.C., ch. 24, § 8 (2000) (Can.).
90 International Criminal Court Act, 2001, c. 17, § 51(1) (Eng.).
Beyond the Alien Tort Claims Act
26:43 (2005)
torts recognized by the U.S. Supreme Court as being actionable under the
ATCA. 91 Thus, criminal litigation for extraterritorial abuses may parallel
the restrictive approach the U.S. Supreme Court has taken in interpreting
civil liability under the ATCA.
III. INTERNATIONAL SOLUTIONS
Two problems associated with domestic solutions for addressing
extraterritorial corporate abuses are, one, that the method of attributing
liability to corporations differs from state to state and, two, that a
corporation, which could be found "guilty" in one jurisdiction, may escape
liability altogether in another. An international solution for addressing
corporate wrongs would avoid these problems and would instead ensure a
harmonized approach across states in determining corporate liability for
abuses. However, as the experience with the creation of the International
Criminal Court ("ICC") has demonstrated, forging a common treaty that is
satisfactory to all states in the world is a difficult process. 92 Moreover,
given the allegations that the Bush administration is interested in curtailing
the ATCA 93 and its disinclination to sign the Rome Statute of the ICC,9 4 it
is likely that the United States will exhibit a similar reluctance to join any
other international solution that attempts to govern corporate conduct.
Nevertheless, despite U.S. refusal to join the Rome Statute, the ICC is
enjoying some success and it is possible that an international solution to
address corporate wrongs would enjoy similar success.
The next section examines three possible solutions at the international
level for addressing transnational corporate liability. The first solution
involves extending the jurisdiction of the ICC. Currently, the ICC does not
provide coverage under its ambit to victims of corporate crimes. However,
its structure and textual language make it a viable ground for extension of
its jurisdiction.
A second solution would be to submit the victims' claims against a
corporation to a specialized international tribunal with expertise in criminal,
business, and human rights law. Several precedents already exist in the
areas of criminal, business, and human rights law that suggest that their
spheres of expertise could extend to include jurisdiction over corporate
91 See supra Part II.A.I.
92 See Andrew Clapham, The Question of Jurisdiction Under International Criminal Law
over Legal Persons: Lessons from the Rome Conference on an International Criminal Court,
in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 146 (M.T.
Kamminga and S. Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
93 See supra note 11.
94 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90,
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 1002 (1998), available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/statute/
romefra.htm [hereinafter Rome Statute].
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accountability claims.
The final solution to consider is corporate codes of conduct.
Currently, several international organizations, most notably the United
Nations, maintain codes of conduct that are aimed at governing globalized
corporate behavior. The structure and effectiveness of these international
codes of conduct will be examined.
A. The International Criminal Court
1. The History of the ICC's Attempt at Jurisdiction Over Legal Persons
On July 17, 1998, the Rome Statute, which created the ICC, was
adopted by an overwhelming majority of states. 95 One notable exception
was the United States, which continues to refuse to sign the Rome Statute.
At present, there are approximately 139 signatories to the treaty, 99 of
which have also ratified it.
96
In its definition of crimes, the ICC includes genocide, murder, torture,
and kidnapping. 97 However, the ICC's jurisdiction over these crimes is
limited to those crimes that have occurred in the territory of a state party or
where the accused is a national of a state party.98 In addition, Article 25(1)
of the Rome Statute mandates that the ICC's jurisdiction only be over
natural persons, not legal persons.
During negotiations of the Rome Statute, the participating states
contemplated including legal persons under the ambit of the ICC. The
French delegation put forward a proposal suggesting that criminal
organizations, such as those mentioned in the Nuremberg trials, should be
identified as illegal and closed down or dissolved.99 Weeks of negotiations
followed and the parties put together a draft text on legal persons. 100 The
draft text contained language that allowed the ICC to have jurisdiction over
legal persons, other than states, when the crimes were committed on behalf
of, or by agents or representatives of, the legal person. 10 1 In the end,
however, the final working paper produced by the consulting states changed
the focus from legal persons to juridical persons to highlight the importance
95 Id.
96 See COALITION FOR THE ICC, Currently the Rome Statute of the ICC has 139
Signatories and 99 Ratifications, at http://www.iccnow.org/countryinfo/
worldsigsandratifications.html (last visited Oct. 19, 2005).
97 Rome Statute, supra note 94, at arts. 6-7.
98 Id. at art. 12; see id. at art. 13(b) (noting that the ICC can also exercise jurisdiction
over a crime if the Security Council refers the alleged crime to an ICC Prosecutor).
99 Clapham, supra note 92, at 146.
100 Id.
10 Id. at 144.
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of individual prosecutions over prosecutions of legal entities.10 2 A juridical
person was defined as a corporation with the objective of seeking a profit or
benefit, and excluded states and non-profit organizations. 10 3 The working
paper allowed for charges to be brought against a juridical person only if
the natural person controlling the legal entity committed the crime on behalf
of and with the consent of the legal entity and if the natural person was
convicted of the crime charged. Nevertheless, the parties were still
unable to agree on the text of the provision and eventually the French
delegation withdrew its proposal.10 5 As a result, the ICC's jurisdiction does
not extend to corporations.
2. Proposed Extensions of ICC Jurisdiction
Amendments to the Rome Statute become a possibility after the statute
has been entered into force for seven years.' 0 6 Either consensus or a two-
thirds majority is needed for any amendments' 0 7 and the statute also
mandates a review of the statute in its entirety seven years after entry into
force.10 8  Thus, amendments to the jurisdiction of the ICC cannot be
considered before July 2009.
Nevertheless, the ICC may still provide an adequate forum for the
adjudication of corporate abuse claims if its jurisdiction is extended to
include legal persons. The French proposal to extend jurisdiction to legal
persons was withdrawn due to time constraints, disagreements over whether
to include language to cover terrorist organizations, procedural problems,
and the general notion of corporate criminal responsibility being an
unfamiliar idea.' 09
However, reconsidering the extension of ICC jurisdiction to legal
persons during the mandatory review in 2009 might alleviate many of the
problems identified. First and most importantly, sufficient time could be
allowed for all state parties to consider the issue of including legal persons
in the jurisdiction of the ICC. Second, to ensure the extension of
jurisdiction to legal persons, the statute's definition of "legal persons"
should pertain only to profit-making organizations and exclude states, state
102 Id.
103 Id.
104 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of
an International Criminal Court, Working Paper of the Committee on General Principles of
Criminal Law on Article 23, Paragraphs 5 and 6, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.183/C.1/WGGP/L.5/
Rev.2 (July 3, 1998).
105 Clapham, supra note 92, at 157.
106 Rome Statute, supra note 94, at art. 121(1).
107 Id. at art. 121(3).
108 Id. at art. 123(1).
109 Clapham, supra note 92, at 157.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 26:43 (2005)
agencies, non-governmental organizations, or any organizations with
predominantly political aims. Broadening the focus of "legal persons" to
include organizations other than those with a primary aim towards profits
will probably not pass the muster of many states due to concerns over their
own sovereignty and their trepidation about unintentionally including the
acts of territories that are struggling for self-determination. Furthermore,
the possibility of states becoming more familiar with the concept of
corporate criminal responsibility as a whole by 2009 seems reasonable
given the multitude of actions targeting transnational corporate abuses
promulgated by alleged victims in a variety of different fora.
Extending the ICC's jurisdiction to "legal persons" is only the first
step towards using it as a forum for attaching liability to corporations for
transnational wrongs. Provided that a multitude of persons comprise a
corporation, the parties must also determine how to attribute liability to a
corporation. That is, they must determine which natural person's actions
can be attributable as an act of the corporation. One solution would be to
use the "directing mind" theory. Under this theory, only criminal acts by
individuals, who are delegated the governing executive authority of the
corporation, or who have the power to act in the name of the corporation,
are attributable to the corporation if they act within the scope of their
authority and in the interest of the corporation." 0  This exempts a
corporation from liability for any acts committed by lower level employees,
which restricts its susceptibility to criminal liability for petty acts while
ensuring that the corporation is still accountable for acts on a larger scale,
the normal realm for human rights violations. In addition, this solution
does not require that an individual employee be found guilty for the
condemned act. Under the first proposal for extension of the ICC's
jurisdiction over legal persons, this had been a required element."'
To properly encapsulate corporate liability under the ICC, the
definition of crimes should also be expanded to include environmental
damage. Thus, where the corporation's resultant act leads to widespread
and significant environmental damage that affects the life and/or well being
of plant, animal, or human health, the commission of a crime should be
established.
Finally, the penalties for guilty persons also need to be modified in
order to appreciate the distinction between a natural and a legal person.
Currently, the ICC's penalty options are either imprisonment or fines."'
However, imprisonment is not a viable penalty for a corporation unless the
directing mind of that corporation is also separately found guilty.
110 See FAFO, supra note 87 (using variations of the "directing mind" theory to attribute
liability to corporations in Canada, the United Kingdom, Norway, and France).
111 Clapham, supra note 92, at 144.
112 Rome Statute, supra note 94, at art. 77.
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Moreover, whereas a monetary fine may result in hardship for a natural
person, it may be an insignificant penalty for a wealthy corporation. As a
result, penalties for "guilty" corporations should include substantial
monetary fines that are based on a percentage of the corporation's pre-tax
profits or its gross revenue, and, for the most heinous of offenses,
dissolution of the corporation.
Extending the jurisdiction of the ICC to legal persons is a complex
procedure that will undoubtedly be met with opposition from business
entities. Moreover, given the divergent views of the ICC's current
members and its already failed attempt at extending the jurisdiction to legal
persons, future negotiations on this matter are sure to be fraught with
difficulty. Nevertheless, success in this realm is possible, as ICC members
have already demonstrated from their ability to cooperate and compromise
with the Rome Statute. Furthermore, given that an extension of ICC
jurisdiction could achieve a milestone in the area of corporate
accountability, it may be worth the likely problem-plagued process.
B. Specialized Tribunals
The preponderance of tribunals handling criminal prosecutions, human
rights complaints, and international business grievances acknowledges the
potential for individual ad hoc or specialized tribunals as another
appropriate forum for combating transnational corporate abuses.
Additionally, as a transnational corporate abuse claim involves elements of
criminal law, human rights law, and aspects of commercial law, it is useful
to examine the existing tribunals that offer expertise in these areas.
The relative success of the International Criminal Tribunals addressing
the atrocities committed in both Yugoslavia and Rwanda demonstrates a
tribunal's ability to effectively address criminal wrongs.' 13 Moreover, the
flurry of activity by human rights tribunals, such as the European Court of
Human Rights, H4 the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights,
the Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights, and the
United Nations Human Rights Committee, 115 all of which manage disputes
ranging from treatment of transgendered individuals to a person's right to
113 See GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNooPs, SURRENDERING TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURTS: CONTEMPORARY PRACTICE AND PROCEDURES 1 (2002) (discussing the International
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia).
114 See Brian Walsh, International Human Rights Before Domestic Courts: Remarks, 70
ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 77 (1996).
115 See OFFICE OF THE HIGH COMM'R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, Overview of Procedure, at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/8/over.htm (last visited Oct. 19, 2005) (showing that
under the United Nations Human Rights Committee approach, individual complaints are
made to the Human Rights Committee which then assesses a complaint based on the written
information provided, with the result that it may lead to a change in a state's laws based
upon the Committee's assessment).
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protection based on political opinion, 1 6 suggests that tribunals are also
effectively managing broad-based human rights complaints. Finally,
international arbitral panels, particularly those in which individuals have
brought complaints against states, such as the actions promulgated under
the rubric of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes ("ICSID"), are particularly adept at handling the business aspects
of transnational commercial disputes.' 1
7
The construction of a tribunal specializing in transnational corporate
abuses can be accomplished by combining the individual expertise of the
criminal, human rights, and international commercial tribunals. First,
similar to all three types of tribunals, a charter document or treaty is needed
to lay down the obligations and duties of transnational corporations, detail
breaches of those obligations and duties, and specify the penalties for any
subsequent breaches. This is probably the most complex and problematic
aspect of this model because an international consensus will be needed in
order to draft such a constituent document. Furthermore, many of the
problems faced by the parties to the ICC in drafting its constituent treaty
will likely reappear during this process. Nonetheless, each criminal, human
rights, and international commercial tribunal mentioned above has managed
to achieve consensus in order to form a constituent document, which
suggests that similar success can be achieved in the formulation of a
document for the construction of a transnational corporate abuse forum.
Once the substantive aspects of the tribunal have been delineated in the
constituent treaty, it will be necessary to outline the procedural aspects of
the tribunal. This raises several questions. Similar to the international
criminal tribunals, should lawyers be provided to the alleged victims or
should the victims resort to private counsel, as is the practice of the
European Court of Human Rights and ICSID tribunals? Should the rules of
procedure be based on common law or civil law, or should a hybrid
approach of the two forms be used, as is done in international commercial
arbitral tribunals? Will this newly-created tribunal be based on universal
jurisdiction, or will it only accept claims from parties who are parties to the
constituent treaty? Can individual complainants bring a claim directly to
the tribunal, or must they rely on their state to bring a claim on their behalf?.
These are only a few of the many procedural issues that will need to be
determined in creating a forum for addressing corporate abuses.
Although precedents from numerous highly-specialized tribunals
combating criminal, human rights, and transnational business violations can
form the basis of a specialized tribunal for addressing transnational
corporate abuses, the biggest problem with the success of this model lies in
116 See Jazairi v. Canada, U.N. CCPR, Hum. Rts. Comm'n, Comm. No. 958/2000, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/C/82/D/958/2000.
117 id.
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states being unable to achieve a consensus on several of the substantive and
procedural elements of the model. However, with continued negotiations
and ample time for state concerns to be addressed, a specialized tribunal can
arguably be a viable alternative forum for addressing transnational
corporate abuses.
C. Codes of Conduct
Both the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
("OECD") and the United Nations ("U.N.") have attempted proactively to
combat the problematic aspects of international business practices with
guidelines for recommended business conduct. The next sections examine
these in greater detail.
1. OECD Guidelines
In 2000, the OECD revised its Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises ("the Guidelines"). 118 The Guidelines are recommendations to
multinational enterprises providing "voluntary principles and standards for
responsible business conduct consistent with applicable laws." 119 A key
aspect of the Guidelines, which led to its adoption by the 30 member states
of the OECD and three additional states, 20 is that they are voluntary and
not legally enforceable.
The Guidelines begin with the delineation of general policies
encouraging multinational enterprises to contribute to economic, social, and
environmental progress with the aim of achieving sustainable development
while respecting the human rights of those affected by the multinational
enterprise's activities.1 21 They then outline specific obligations under the
headings of employment and industrial relations, environment, and bribery,
among others.
Implementation of the Guidelines is by way of National Contact Points
("NCPs"), governmental representatives, or co-operative bodies in each
state that has adopted the Guidelines. 22 The NCP's role is to further the
objectives of the Guidelines and report annually on its state's progress to
the Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises,
... ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., The OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises (revised 2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf
[hereinafter OECD Guidelines].
119 Id. at 15.
120 NATIONAL CONTACT POINT, CANADA, Canada and the OECD Guidelines for
Multinational Enterprises: Promoting Corporate Social Responsibility, available at
http://www.ncp-pcn.gc.ca/multinational-en.asp (last updated Oct. 3, 2002).
121 OECD Guidelines, supra note 118, at 19.
122 Id. at 35.
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the umbrella agency overseeing the Guidelines.
123
Complaints against multinational enterprises for violations of the
Guidelines are made to the NCP, which makes an initial assessment.1
24
Upon completion of the initial assessment, the NCP responds to the
complaining party and determines whether the issues merit further
consideration. 25 If it deems the issue not worthy of subsequent
consideration, the NCP gives reasons for its decision. However, if it
decides to consider the issue further, the NCP helps the party attempt to
resolve the issue, which may involve the NCP offering or facilitating access
to consensual and non-adversarial procedures, such as conciliation or
mediation. 1
26
Although the non-binding and voluntary nature of the Guidelines
facilitated their adoption by a multitude of states, these two factors also
detract from the effectiveness of the Guidelines. Principally, this is because
multinational enterprises are not required to adhere to the Guidelines and
there are no sanctions for a failure to do so. Moreover, a complaint by a
victims group against a multinational enterprise for alleged violations of the
Guidelines must first be assessed by the NCP, a state representative. Thus,
for those victims of human rights violations where the state has acted in
concert with a multinational enterprise, turning to the NCP for assistance
could be meaningless. In addition, there is no appeal from the NCP's initial
assessment decision. Thus, if the NCP deems an issue to be meritless,
victims have no further recourse under the Guidelines. Similarly, if the
NCP cannot help the parties resolve their issue, even through conciliation or
mediation, the Guidelines do not provide any further direction. Finally, the
Guidelines do not address any of the procedural issues faced by the U.S.
courts in ATCA actions, which would be relevant here.
As a result, although the Guidelines take a step forward in laying out a
code of conduct for multinational enterprises to adhere to in their
transnational business activities, without some form of enforcement
mechanism, the Guidelines are more commendable in theory than in
practice.
2. U.N. Norms
In August of 2003, the U.N. Sub-Commission for the Promotion and
Protection of Human Rights approved the Norms on the Responsibilities of
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to
123 Id. at 32.
124 Id. at 36.
125 id.
126 id.
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Human Rights ("Norms"). 127 The Norms propose human rights standards
for transnational corporations and other business enterprises, and delineate a
methodology for businesses to incorporate numerous corporate social
responsibilities. The Norms also recognize the general obligation placed
upon corporations to "promote, secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure
respect of and protect human rights recognized in international as well as
national law." 128 In addition, the Norms, which do not have the same status
as a U.N. treaty, also recognize specific obligations including workers'
rights, environmental protection, the right to equal opportunities, and the
right to security of person.' 9
The obligations enumerated in the Norms are derived from existing
international human rights instruments including the Charter of the United
Nations, 13 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,13 1 and other notable
international human rights instruments.13 2 As a result, an impression is
created that the Norms merely restate existing international human rights
law that already applies or should apply to corporate conduct. 133 However,
1217 U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess., 22d mtg., at Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub2/2003/I 2/Rev.2 (2003) [hereinafter Norms].
128 Id. at pmbl.
129Id. 1-14.
130 U.N. CHARTER, available at http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter.
131 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217(111), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
Supp. No. 13, at 71, UN Doc. A/810 (1948).
132 The Norms also reference by name, among others, the following human rights
instruments: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
adopted Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Convention against Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S.
85; Slavery Convention, Sept. 25, 1926, 26 Stat. 2183, 60 U.N.T.S. 253; Supplementary
Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institutions and Practices
Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18 U.S.T. 3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3; International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened for signature Mar. 7,
1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
against Women, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. D, 95-2
(1978), 993 U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966,
S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, corrigendum adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 1059
U.N.T.S. 451; Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3,
reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1456 (1989); Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760
U.N.T.S. 79, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818; Convention on Civil Liability for Damage
Resulting from Activities Dangerous to the Environment, June 21, 1993, Europ. T.S. No.
150, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/EN/Treaties/Html/150.htm; Convention
on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions,
Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1, available at http://www.olis.oecd.org/olis/1997doc.nsf/
LinkTo/daffe-ime-br(97)20.
133 Carolin F. Hillemanns, U.N. Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporation and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, 4 GERMAN L.J.
1065, 1070 (2003).
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it is argued that the added benefit of the Norms comes from its introduction
as an implementation mechanism to ensure the observation of the
obligations set out in the Norms by corporations.
134
The implementation mechanism contemplated by the Norms sets out a
three-part process. First, corporations are expected to adopt, disseminate,
and implement internal rules of operation in compliance with the Norms
and then periodically report on and take other measures to fully implement
the Norms. 135 Second, activities of corporations are subject to transparent
and independent periodic monitoring and verification by the U.N. and
"other international and national mechanisms already in existence or yet to
be created," which are mandated to consider input from stakeholders, likely
arising from complaints of violations of the Norms. 13 6 Finally, states are
expected to "establish and reinforce the necessary legal and administrative
framework" to ensure implementation of the Norms by corporations.
37
Failure to abide by the Norms requires the corporations and business
entities to provide reparations to those affected. The Norms indicate that
damages should be assessed by national courts and/or international
tribunals, but fail to specify which courts or tribunals. 1
38
The Norms provide a thorough listing of the types of duties and
obligations by which corporations engaging in transnational activities
should abide. In this way, the Norms take a step forward in the area of
corporate social responsibility by addressing all potential adversities of a
business transaction and by specifically focusing attention upon the rarely
attended-to environmental aspects of corporate activity. However, the
Norms still suffer from a number of shortcomings. Most notably, the
suggested enforcement mechanism lacks potency. The Norms do not
suggest a viable framework for their implementation, relying instead upon
unspecified national or international mechanisms to subject corporations to
periodic monitoring. In fact, these unspecified mechanisms may not even
be in existence and may need to be created for the specific purpose of
monitoring. Moreover, guidelines are not given for the calculation of
damages for violations of the Norms, nor are the courts or international
tribunals specified, and the applicable law is referenced only as national or
international law. In addition, the implementation mechanism gives a role
to states in creating the framework for ensuring compliance with the Norms
but ignores the fact that states often act in complicity with corporations
134 Surya Deva, UN's Human Rights Norms for Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises: An Imperfect Step in the Right Direction?, 10 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.
L. 493,498-99 (2004).
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engaged in human rights abuses. 139 The implementation mechanisms of the
Norms are thus at odds with victims suffering from abuses committed by
corporations acting in concert with the state. Finally, the Norms do not
provide any direction on procedural issues such as determining which
national court or international tribunal has jurisdiction over an alleged
violation of the Norms. Thus, where an American corporation operating in
Burma is accused of violating the Norms in Burma, do the U.S. courts or
the Burmese courts have jurisdiction and how is this determined?
Additionally, in determining forum non conveniens, which jurisdiction's
rules are used? Finally, can the Burmese citizens initiate an action against
the corporation directly or must the Burmese government bring the claim on
its citizens' behalf? Without guidance on these and other procedural issues
related to initiating actions against transnational corporations, the
effectiveness of the Norms is lessened considerably.
However, in contrast to the OECD Guidelines and the U.N.'s first
attempt at addressing human rights concerns as they relate to business
initiatives by way of the United Nations Global Compact, 40 the Norms'
legalistic nature and proposed enforcement mechanism result in a vast
improvement over other codes of conduct. Yet, the problems associated
with its implementation mechanism detract from its overall effectiveness.
Nevertheless, the uproar caused by various commercial non-governmental
organizations over the "legalistic approach" of the Norms suggests that,
implementation mechanism problems aside, the Norms may still have an
effect on the actions of transnational corporations.141
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION TO ENSURE CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR TRANSNATIONAL ABUSES
Thus far, this article has canvassed various mechanisms for attributing
liability to corporations, both domestic and international, and has attempted
to identify the advantages and disadvantages of each of the existing
139 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 239-40; Hall, supra note 31, at 410.
140 The Global Compact is intended to ally companies with labor, U.N. agencies, and
civil society to support its ten core principles under the headings of human rights, labor
standards, environment and anti-corruption. For more information, see U.N., The Global
Compact, at http://www.unglobalcompact.org.
141 The International Organization of Employees and the International Chamber of
Commerce are some of the non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") that oppose the
Norms. See Joint Written Statement submitted by the International Chamber of Commerce
and the International Organization of Employers, Non-governmental Organizations in
General Consultative Status, U.N. ESCOR, 55th Sess., at Agenda Item 4, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/NGO/44 (2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/
Huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.NGO.44.En [hereinafter Joint Statement]. See
also Shell Leads International Business Campaign Against UN Human Rights Norms, CEO
Info Brief (March 2004), available at http://www.corporateeurope.org/norms.html.
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mechanisms. This section builds upon the identified mechanisms and
argues for the creation of a new international mechanism that draws upon
the advantages of several of the aforementioned domestic and international
mechanisms.
Given the state-to-state variation of domestic mechanisms for
attributing liability to corporations for transnational abuses, it seems likely
that an international mechanism is more suited to ensuring corporate
accountability for transnational abuses. However, domestic mechanisms
such as the ATCA or the use of domestic criminal law offer certain
advantages over an international solution. First, as they require approval
only by one government, domestic mechanisms are much easier to
introduce and control. In addition, since a domestic mechanism often relies
on pre-existing legislation, once a court decides that the legislation or
principle can be used to hold corporations liable for extraterritorial abuses,
it sets a precedent that can be used by other plaintiffs.
Nevertheless, domestic solutions suffer from many procedural
problems, which were identified earlier in Part II. In addition, domestic
solutions require national court judges to interpret international law in
determining a plaintiffs claim, an area in which they may have limited
experience. Furthermore, most civil and criminal domestic mechanisms
offer redress only to plaintiffs with a tie to the domestic state, leaving all
plaintiffs who cannot satisfy the jurisdictional requirement with limited
options. Finally, the ATCA, which is arguably the most successful of the
domestic solutions, is in jeopardy as a result of interpretation by the U.S.
Supreme Court and also as a result of the Bush administration's distaste for
the Act. For these reasons, a domestic mechanism, on its own, cannot
ensure corporate accountability for transnational abuses in the same manner
that an international mechanism might be able to.
One possible effective international mechanism is the use of the ICC
by way of extending its jurisdiction over legal persons. The ICC possesses
an existing multilateral treaty that could be amended, as suggested above, to
incorporate the introduction of legal persons. In addition, its court structure
ensures that violations of the treaty will be enforced. However, the greatest
failing of the ICC as a means of ensuring corporate accountability for
extraterritorial abuses is the lack of U.S. participation. The United States'
continued failure to sign the Rome Statute would likely exempt all U.S.
corporations from the jurisdiction of the ICC even if its jurisdiction were
extended to legal persons. 142 Given that many of the world's corporations
142 It is unclear whether the ICC has jurisdiction over non-state parties without their
consent. Compare Michael P. Scharf, The ICC's Jurisdiction Over The Nationals Of Non-
Party States: A Critique Of The U.S. Position, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 67, 70 (2001),
with Bartram S. Brown, U.S. Objections to the Statute of the International Criminal Court: A
Brief Response, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 855 (1999).
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are American, U.S. absence from the ICC leaves victims of abuse at the
hands of U.S. corporations without any means of redress. 143 Moreover, the
value of the ICC is its expertise over criminal acts. It does not have any
expertise in dealing with businesses or business transactions that result in
these acts. Curtailing corporate criminal liability requires both a
methodology that dictates, informs, and guides a corporation's transnational
business activities and an enforcement mechanism that punishes improper
conduct. The ICC only contains an enforcement mechanism, making the
ICC an ineffective international solution for ensuring corporate
accountability. 144  Conversely, the lack of effective enforcement
mechanisms in the codes of conduct proposed by the OECD and the U.N.
detracts from their effectiveness.
A. A Multilateral Treaty/Tribunal Approach
To properly ensure corporate accountability for transnational abuses, a
multilateral solution both outlining corporate obligations and possessing an
enforcement mechanism is needed. This solution has two components.
First, a multilateral treaty specifying the human rights obligations of
corporations is necessary. Alternatively, a multilateral code of conduct,
such as the Norms, can be used to establish the duties and obligations of
corporations in relation to human rights. At a minimum, either the
constituent treaty or the code of conduct must identify human rights
violations which are recognized by customary international law. For
example, the Norms prescribe a minimum list of egregious violations of
human rights that would fulfill a base requirement for any constituent treaty
or code of conduct. 145  However, a constituent document should also
specifically require the protection of economic, social, cultural, and
environmental rights. Thus, although the Norms recognize the corporations'
need to protect economic, social, cultural, and environmental rights
143 However, as long as the ATCA continues to exist, it is likely that victims of
transnational abuses caused by U.S. corporations will be able to use the ATCA, so long as
the alleged human rights violations fit within the violations recognized by the U.S. Supreme
Court.
'44 The likelihood of the United States signing the Rome Statute is unclear, even with a
change in administration. See Julie Campagna, United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities
of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human
Rights: The International Community Asserts Binding Law on the Global Rule Makers, 37 J.
MARSHALL L. REv. 1205, 1249 (2004).
145 The Norms identify the following egregious human rights abuses: war crimes; crimes
against humanity; genocide; torture; forced disappearance; forced or compulsory labor;
hostage-taking; extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions; and other violations of
humanitarian law and international crimes against the human person. Norms, supra note 127,
at art. 3.
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generally, 146 they do not, for example, specifically call for the protection of
indigenous peoples or prohibit egregious environmental damage that causes
harm to plant, animal, or human health.
Similar to the controversial negotiations surrounding the creation of
the ICC, negotiating a multilateral treaty or code of conduct delineating the
human rights obligations of corporations may be difficult. Moreover, it is
possible that the United States will abstain from joining any resulting treaty
for the same reasons it refused to sign the Rome Statute. Perhaps for that
reason, the Norms, which would only require minimal amendments as
outlined above, may garner more widespread support from states.
However, the second component of this solution, the institution of an
effective enforcement mechanism, is likely to be the most problematic
aspect of this solution. The nongovernmental organizations contesting the
Norms are most concerned with the binding nature and enforcement aspects
of the Norms, not the delineation of corporate obligations. 147 Similarly, one
ground for U.S. opposition to the Rome Statute was the fear that U.S.
military troops would be wrongly ensnared in the ICC's enforcement
mechanism.' 4 Thus, any enforcement mechanism will need to be sensitive
to state needs while ensuring that the mechanism still remains effective.
One approach would be to have the constituent treaty or norms
outlining corporate obligations as they pertain to the prevention of
transnational abuses enforced at a specialized tribunal similar to the one
described in Part 111(B) of this article. This tribunal could constitute the
enforcement arm of the constituent treaty or code of conduct. Under this
approach, individual plaintiffs citing a violation of the constituent treaty or
code of conduct could initiate an action against the allegedly offending
corporation at the tribunal. Experts in business, human rights, and criminal
law could comprise the list of adjudicators, and the tribunal could either be
a permanent or an ad hoc body, the latter of which would substantially
reduce all associated costs. These and other procedural issues, including
sanctions for offenses, the definition of a corporation, and costs, could be
negotiated and determined by the participating states.
A second approach would be to use domestic mechanisms to enforce
the obligations laid out in the constituent treaty or code of conduct. Using
146 See id. at arts. 12, 14.
147 For example, the International Chamber of Commerce and the International
Organization of Employers note that "the binding and legalistic approach of the draft norms
will not meet the diverse needs and circumstances of companies and will limit the innovation
and creativity shown by companies in addressing human rights issues in the context of their
efforts to find practical and workable solutions to corporate responsibility challenges." See
Joint Statement, supra note 141.
148 GLOBAL POLICY FORUM, US Opposition to the International Criminal Court, at
http://www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/usindex.htm; Jonathan F. Fanton, US Obstructs
Global Justice, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 29, 2005, at B 11.
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this approach, states would only be obliged to use existing domestic
mechanisms or create internal mechanisms to address this issue.
Accordingly, in the United States, U.S. domestic rules would still govern
the procedural aspects of a transnational abuse claim against a corporation,
but U.S. courts could interpret and utilize the constituent multilateral treaty
or code of conduct to determine the substantive aspects of the claim. The
advantage to this approach is that states have greater control over whom and
in what manner they exercise the enforcement mechanism. Thus, for states
that do not recognize corporate criminal responsibility, they could choose
not to establish this concept, concentrating instead on establishing a
corporation's civil liability. 149 However, the biggest disadvantage to this
approach is the variety of approaches to enforcement of the constituent
treaty or norms from nation to nation. Thus, a plaintiff injured by a
corporation in State A may not receive the same level of redress that a
plaintiff injured by the corporation in State B may receive. For this reason,
the use of a specialized tribunal as the enforcing arm of a constituent treaty
or norms outlining corporate responsibilities for transnational harms is
preferred.
A third approach would be to use domestic mechanisms to the extent
their internal state laws permit and, if a remedy cannot be offered
domestically, to use the specialized tribunal to fill in any remedial gaps.
Thus, a victim would be required to exhaust all domestic mechanisms
before resorting to the specialized tribunal, or alternatively, prove to the
tribunal, as a preliminary matter, that domestic means cannot offer an
adequate remedy. The advantage to this approach is that it limits the costs
associated with establishing a specialized tribunal by limiting its caseload
and by allowing it to be established on an ad hoc or as-needed basis. The
approach also works to deter vexatious or frivolous actions against
corporations, as the domestic mechanisms would filter these claims out.
However, the exercise of jurisdiction by the specialized tribunal in cases
where it is determined that no adequate domestic remedy exists could be
seen as an affront to a state's sovereignty, as the tribunal's ruling implies
that a state cannot adequately manage corporate abuses within its territory,
on its own. This may make states more reluctant to adopt this model.
B. Jurisdiction
Problems with a multilateral approach may also arise from the
constituent treaty or code of conduct's approach to jurisdiction. Under the
Rome Statute and other international treaties, jurisdiction is exercised over
only those who have ratified the treaty or who have consented to it.150 This
M See Clapham, supra note 92.
150 For example, the Rome Statute dictates that a state that is a party to the statute accepts
ICC jurisdiction. See Rome Statute, supra note 94, at art. 12(1). Alternatively, a state that is
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is the most preferable approach to jurisdiction as it imposes obligations only
upon those who have indicated a willingness to be bound by those
obligations. However, should the United States, or any other state which is
home to a significant number of multinational corporations, indicate an
aversion to signing a constituent treaty outlining corporate responsibilities
for transnational harms or an unwillingness to be bound by an international
code of conduct, the effectiveness of this approach to jurisdiction will be
lessened. As a result, there may remain a number of multinational
corporations over which jurisdiction cannot be exercised.
An alternative approach would be to exercise jurisdiction over the
locus of the human rights violations. Thus, if the territory in which the
violation occurred belongs to a state who is a party to the multilateral treaty
or code of conduct, the tribunal would have jurisdiction over the violation
even if the perpetrating corporation belonged to a state that was not a party
to the treaty or code of conduct. This form of territorial jurisdiction is a
rather conservative approach to jurisdiction and is one basis used by the
ICC to exercise jurisdiction over criminal offenses. However, in contrast to
the ICC's approach, the use of territorial jurisdiction without a state's
consent would be necessary under this model under circumstances where
transnational corporate abuse claims involve the state acting in concert with
the corporation to commit the violation.
151
Significant state participation and ratification of a multilateral treaty or
code of conduct outlining corporate responsibilities for transnational harms
is essential to the effectiveness of this model. The participation of only a
handful of states in this model would detract from the legitimacy of the
treaty and the tribunal and would not reflect the will of the preponderance
of states; instead, it would reflect the will of a few states who are willing to
police the world's corporations. Moreover, significant state participation
allows the use of jurisdiction based on treaty ratification or territorial
jurisdiction and reduces the need for universal jurisdiction.
However, without the commitment of a substantial number of states,
universal jurisdiction would be essential for implementing this model.
Universal jurisdiction would allow a tribunal to exercise jurisdiction over
corporations who are nationals of states that are not signatories to the
constituent treaty or who have averred to being bound by an international
code of conduct. However, as exemplified by the Belgian experience, this
approach is highly controversial. States who are not a party to the
constituent treaty or code of conduct will be very reluctant to have their
corporations be bound by obligations to which they did not consent. In
addition, the use of universal jurisdiction may also suffer from problems of
not a party to the statute can consent to ICC jurisdiction. Id. at art. 12(2).
151 In the past, several corporate abuse claims have implicated the state. For the first case
implicating a state for acting in concert with a corporation, see Unocal, 395 F.3d at 932.
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enforcement. Generally, the enforcement of decisions of international
tribunals is supported by the cooperation of individual states, which
facilitates the enforcement of these decisions, often treating them as if they
were the decisions of domestic courts. 152 However, a U.S. court will likely
refuse to enforce a judgment rendered under this model against the assets of
a corporation in its jurisdiction if the United States is not a party to the
constituent treaty or code of conduct that created the tribunal. Nevertheless,
as many victims of corporate abuse are interested in public shame over
monetary redress, a judgment against the corporation, even without
enforcement, will still highlight the plight of the victims and bring negative
international attention upon the corporation. This is at least a first step
towards curbing corporate human rights violations.
C. Benefits of the Model
The establishment of a constituent treaty or international code of
conduct in conjunction with a specialized tribunal as its enforcement arm
would provide several important benefits. First, the multilateral solution
would create an additional legal avenue for victims of corporate human
rights violations. Domestic remedies, which exist in certain countries,
could be used to supplement the multilateral solution. The multilateral
approach would lend "increased international legitimacy" to the domestic
remedies. 153 Second, the multilateral approach grants all victims, regardless
of whether their state provides redress in domestic courts, an opportunity to
combat their harms. In addition, this approach provides a uniform solution
because it ensures that two victims do not receive different levels of redress
as a result of living in different states. Finally, the creation of a multilateral
treaty or code of conduct with an enforcement mechanism highlights the
importance of combating transnational abuses as a global, and not a
localized, problem. It also places greater pressure on corporations to
conduct their business operations in a more socially conscious manner,
whether or not their home state is a party to the treaty or code of conduct.
The multilateral approach also globally propagates the stigma that is
attached to businesses engaging in transnational abuses.
152 For example, a judgment rendered by an ICSID Tribunal is enforced as a domestic
judgment in the domestic courts of signatories to the ICSID's constituent treaty. See
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other
States, Mar. 18, 1965, art. 54(1), 17 U.S.T. 1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159, 194. In addition, the
Rome Statute prescribes that state parties "shall give effect to fines or forfeitures ordered by
the Court." Rome Statute, supra note 94, at art. 109.
153 Developments in the Law - International Criminal Law: Corporate Liability for
Violations of International Human Rights Law, 114 HARv. L. REv. 2025, 2048 (2001).
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V. CONCLUSION
Corporate accountability for transnational abuses remains a complex
problem that continues to plague both victims and states. Domestic
solutions are an important step towards combating this problem, but they
remain an inadequate solution due to national variations, restrictive
approaches to defining human rights violations, and procedural problems.
The ATCA continues to surpass other domestic mechanisms as a result of
its more liberal approach to many of the substantive and procedural
problems afflicting domestic mechanisms in other states. However, its
short list of recognized human rights violations, in addition to attempts by
the U.S. Supreme Court and the Bush administration to curb its ambit,
suggests that there needs to be a more appropriate mechanism for
addressing a corporation's transnational human rights abuses.
Holding corporations responsible for transnational abuses is a problem
that extends beyond the borders of a single state. Thus, the answer to this
problem cannot lie primarily in an expansion of the ATCA or other
domestic mechanisms. A multilateral solution, such as the combination of a
multilateral treaty or code of conduct with an effective enforcement
mechanism, is likely to be the most effective manner of addressing this
problem on a global scale.
International agreement on the definition of corporate obligations will
increase the effectiveness of this multilateral solution. Thus a treaty or
international code of conduct agreed to by most of the world's states is
essential. Moreover, an effective enforcement mechanism is also critical to
ensure the compliance of those corporations who continue to defy the
obligations delineated for them in the constituent treaty or code of conduct.
Domestic enforcement mechanisms are the first line of defense in
combating corporate abuses but they must, at a minimum, be supplemented
by an international specialized tribunal, which can fill in remedial gaps by
providing redress to victims in states without enforcement mechanisms or
to those who are not offered an adequate domestic remedy. An even more
effective solution is to have an international specialized tribunal usurp the
role of domestic enforcement mechanisms when dealing with transnational
corporations and render it the primary vehicle for addressing transnational
corporate abuses. This would allow the tribunal a greater role in the realm
of corporate social responsibility, reinforcing the world commitment to
promoting corporate accountability.
Good corporate citizenship is essential in the twenty-first century. An
exclusive focus on profits or the bottom line is no longer enough to sustain
a corporation's goodwill in the eyes of the public. However, a
corporation's failure to act responsibly does not necessarily lead to the same
devastating effects as its victims may experience. As a result, a corporate
accountability mechanism is needed to ensure that wayward corporations
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are encouraged to choose good corporate citizenship over a more
economical, yet irresponsible, option. The global nature of the problems
with corporate accountability demands a global solution. Thus, collective
state action remains the only means of establishing a mechanism that
ensures corporate abusers are punished, their victims are adequately
redressed, and above all, that such conduct is prevented from reoccurring.
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